86-220

No. .....

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
AUG 13 1986
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1985

—o—

JAMES E. WALDRON, JACK HOBBS, and all Retired Federal Officers, Agents, and Employees Similarly Situated in Georgia,

Petitioners,

vs.

MARCUS COLLINS,

Respondent.

—o—

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

—o—

JAMES F. FINDLAY
BOBBY G. BEAZLEY
Counsel for Petitioners
1557 Gordon Highway Suite D
Augusta, Georgia 30906
1-404-736-7141

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
or call collect (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

I

Did the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals exercise an incorrect standard of review and err in concluding that it could not consider jurisdictional claims of petitioners which went beyond the district court's asserted ruling and certification?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
QUESTION PRESENTED	i
OPINIONS BELOW	2
JURISDICTION	2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS	2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT	6
CONCLUSION	10
APPENDIX	App. 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES CITED:

Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Califano, 569 F. 2d 101 (1977) 6

Hahn v. United States, 727 F. 2d 581 (1985) 6

Kipperman v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 554 F. 2d 377 (1977) 6

Ingalls Iron Works Company v. Blackmon, 133 Ga. App. 164, 210 S.E. 2d 378 (1) (1974) 7

Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F. 2d 364 (1974) 8

Norris v. Atlanta & West Point R. Co., 254 Ga. 864, 333 S.E. 2d 835, 838 (1985) 8

STATUTES CITED:

4 U.S.C. § 111 ..... 4, 9, 10

28 U.S.C.A. § 1341 4

42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 ..... 3, 4, 9, 10

O.C.G.A. § 48-2-35 7

O.C.G.A. § 48-2-35(b) 7

O.C.G.A. § 48-2-59 7

O.C.G.A. § 48-3-31 7

O.C.G.A. § 48-7-84 7

O.C.G.A. § 50-30-12 7

United States Constitution, Section I, Fourteenth Amendment 2

No. .....

—o—

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1985

—o—

JAMES E. WALDRON, JACK HOBBS, and all Retired Federal Officers, Agents, and Employees Similarly Situated in Georgia,

Petitioners,

vs.

MARCUS COLLINS,

Respondent.

—o—

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

—o—

The petitioners respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals entered on May 6, 1986 and the subsequent denial of a timely motion for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc on June 30, 1986.

—o—

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals entered on May 6, 1986 is included as Appendix B to the instant petition. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denying the petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc was entered on June 30, 1986, and is included as Appendix C to the instant petition.

———o———

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was entered on May 6, 1986 and a timely suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied on June 30, 1986. This petition for certiorari has been filed within the allowable period from that date; also, jurisdiction is sought because the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did in fact exercise a standard of review of the jurisdictional question below which is in conflict with the decision of another Federal Court of Appeals on the same matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1); Rule 17(1)(a) of this court.

———o———

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1. The United States Constitution, Section I, Fourteenth Amendment:

Section I. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are

citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.

2. The Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 provides that:

The United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for personal service as an officer or employee of the United States, a territory or possession or political subdivision thereof, the government of the District of Columbia, or an agency or instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, by a duly constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation.

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:

Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or to her proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

———o———

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

State granted statutory exemptions from the payment of a State income tax to all persons retired from its employment. All persons retired from the United States Government were excluded from the exemption and required to pay the subject income tax on their retirement benefits. Petitioners asserted that their job descriptions had been identical to those of exempted State employees and that they had contributed to the health and welfare of Georgia equally with exempted State retirees. State offered no evidence of a compelling State interest in giving the exemptions and relied solely on Tax Injunction Statute to refute Federal retiree claims.

Petitioners filed action in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Augusta Division against State of Georgia and its Revenue Commissioner the Honorable Marcus Collins, the respondent herein. Petitioners alleged that the above mentioned practice constituted a discriminatory practice in violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111, an equal protection violation, and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The State and its Revenue Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss under the Tax Injunction Act. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341. District Court certified petitioners' class action involving 100,000+ claimants.

The petitioners alleged 28 grounds in the District Court as to why the State did not provide them with a plain, speedy, efficient, adequate and certain remedy to resolve the dispute, including but not limited to the lack of a class action mechanism; also, petitioners premised that 4 U.S.C. § 111 gave them direct access to the District Court despite the Tax Injunction Statute.

On June 18, 1985 the district entered an order dismissing the State as a party defendant but retaining jurisdiction over the respondent herein, the Honorable Marcus Collins. Said order is included as Appendix "A" to the instant petition.

The District Court stated in part:

> "I am convinced that the plaintiffs *in this case have no remedy which is either speedy or efficient in the courts of Georgia.* This conclusion is no aspersion directed to the noble tribunals of the State. *It is a simple statement that a class action suit in Federal Court will be more efficient than a myriad of different claims,* and that the progress of such—even through appeal—will consume less time than will the process of many claims through the Department of Revenue and the courts of the State."

The District Court certified its June 18, 1985 order for immediate review and commissioner brought interlocutory appeal. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the absence of a provision for class actions does not render Georgia's procedures for litigating tax matters inadequate within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Statute. Further, Court of Appeals declined to advance beyond the District Court's ruling to consider petitioner's other jurisdictional claims. See Appendix "B" attached.

———o———

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS EXERCISED AN INCORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW AND IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT IT COULD NOT CONSIDER JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS THAT DID NOT GO BEYOND THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING AND CERTIFICATION.

It was the obligation of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to explore any promissing avenue to the District Court's jurisdiction, whether or not suggested by the parties. See *Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Califano*, 569 F. 2d 101 (1977) (Dist. of Co.). In a third Circuit decision, it was held that a Court of Appeals may consider whether jurisdiction was proper on grounds not asserted below. See *Hahn v. United States*, 727 F. 2d 581 (1985; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1653). Also, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that appeals court could make independent examination of question of jurisdiction of a District Court. See *Kipperman v. Academy Life Ins. Co.*, 554 F. 2d 377 (1977).

It is respectfully submitted that the Eleventh Circuit decision that it could not examine the jurisdiction question beyond the District Court's ruling and certifcation is in conflict with decisions from three other circuits; therefore, the conclusion appears inescapable that a writ of certiorari should issue in the case subjudice pursuant to Rule 17(1)(a) of this court.

Petitioners submit that Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had before it by brief, and otherwise, the following jurisdictional claims which should have been examined and which did, or may, lodge jurisdiction in the District Court despite the Tax Injunction Act:

1. The respondent asserted 4 remedies found in O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-12, 48-2-59, 48-2-35, and 48-3-1 that provided petitioners with a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy; however, these remedies dealt with deficiency assessments and could not be used by any petitioner until the Revenue Commissioner made an assessment against a particular income tax return. See *Ingalls Iron Works Company v. Blackmon,* 133 Ga. App. 164, 210 S. E. 2d 378(1) (1974).

2. That the petitioners have all paid their income tax to the State up and through the 1985 taxable period; therefore, not a single assessment has or will be forthcoming.

3. That under Georgia law the mere filing of an income tax return is not an assessment. See *Ingalls Iron Works Company v. Blackmon, supra.*

4. That it is axiomatic that not a single petitioner could force the respondent to make the necessary assessment required to activate any one of the four State remedies. Assuming, but not deciding, that there was error in any of petitioners' return.

5. In income tax matters in Georgia, injunctive relief is not available to petitioners either jointly or individually. See *O.C.G.A. § 48-7-84.*

6. *O.C.G.A. §§ 48-2-35(A) and 48-2-35(b)(1),* the Georgia refund section expressly states that said sections are only applicable after an *assessment and collection* occurs; therefore, since not a single petitioner has been hit with a deficiency assessment, this section is clearly unavailable.

7. Assuming, but not deciding, that any petitioner were to be hit with the subject assessment for one or more

of the taxable periods in question and chose to litigate all the issues being presented in petitioner's complaint before this court under one of the four involved Georgia methods, the results, or outcome, would not be binding on any other petitioner since the doctrine of "*binding precedent*" has been abolished in Georgia. See *Norris v. Atlanta & West Point R. Co.*, 254 Ga. 864, 333 S.E. 2nd 835, 838 (1985).

8. Noteworthy, is the fact that if any petitioner decides not to pay his income tax for the '86 taxable period for the reasons asserted in their complaint below all in an effort to activate one of the four Georgia methods, he will occupy the role of *tax protestor* and could be prosecuted by the State; also, this *protestor* role is no guarantee that the Commissioner will make the necessary assessment which is a precedent to activating one of the four Georgia methods.

9. That none of the four Georgia methods provide in futuro relief or relief for past discriminatory practice.

10. That it was argued below by petitioners that the case of *Garrett v. Bamford*, 538 F. 2d 364 (1974) stood for the following under the facts and circumstances of the case subjudice.

a) That when in futuro relief is not available under the available State remedies, the Tax Injunction Act is not a bar to Federal relief; likewise when no remedy is available for past discriminatory practices;

b) That a multiplicity of suits jamming up the State courts should be avoided by granting Federal relief;

c) That a State should not be permitted to stand upon burdensome piecemeal review procedures as an ef-

fective defense to valid constitutional and statutory claims Noticed is the fact that this would be the "big picture" if an assessment were made against a single petitioner;

d) That duplicative attorney fee costs, etc. should be avoided by granting Federal relief when the available State remedies require 100,000+ individual review actions assuming in this instance that 100,000+ assessments were made against all the petitioners by the State;

e) That since, the abolishing of the "Doctrine of Binding Precedent" in Georgia, no one relief, if an assessment were made, would extend beyond the individual taxpayer; therefore, Federal relief should be granted; and

f) Inefficiency of separate actions at law involving the same issue and a common defendant, might deter large groups of individuals from seeking judicial relief. Noticed here is that no one petitioner has a remedy in Georgia unless he first becomes a protestor by not paying his tax and succeeds in prompting a deficiency assessment from the Commissioner.

11. That the four Georgia methods deal with deficiency assessments and are not designed to handle 100,000+ 4 U.S.C. § 111 discrimination claims, 100,000+ equal protection claims, and 100,000+ 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 Civil rights claims.

12. That petitioners' 100,000+ claims depend in part on discovery; however, in Georgia the Revenue Commissioner is not a court of record and no discovery can be had against him under the Georgia Civil Practice Act.

13. That 100,000+ petitioners are alleging systematic, intentional, arbitrary, invidious, and purposeful discrimi-

nation by the State against them as a group; therefore, the four Georgia remedies are not, plain, speedy, and efficient even if 100,000+ assessments were made against each petitioner to activate any remedy to the advantage of all assessed petitioners.

14. That if any of the 100,000+ petitioners declined to pay his '86 tax in an effort to activate one of the four involved Georgia methods, he would become a tax protestor with every reason to believe that he would be prosecuted by the State.

15. That a 4 U.S.C. § 111 claim or a 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 claim have never been successful in Georgia under one of the four Georgia methods.

16. That under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, 4 U.S.C. § 111 gives petitioners direct access to the District Court despite the Tax Injunction Statute.

———o———

CONCLUSION

For all of the above and foregoing reasons, petitioners pray that this court grant a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

James F. Findlay
Attorney for Petitioners

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION
CV185-039

JAMES E. WALDRON, JACK HOBBS,
and All Retired Military, Federal Officers, Agents,
and Employees Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs

vs.

MARCUS COLLINS, Individually and in his
Capacity as Georgia State Revenue Commissioner,
and The Agency, Georgia Department of Revenue,

Defendants

ORDER

(Filed June 18, 1985)

Before the court is the defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' recast and amended complaint. The Court has already dismissed the State of Georgia as a party defendant. The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution still has some vitality. "The agency, the Department of Revenue" is not a separate entity but, in truth, an element of the State of Georgia. With respect to the State of Georgia and its agency or element, the Department of Revenue, the complaint is DISMISSED. The state cannot be a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The other defense raised, the Tax Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 1341)[1] is one subject to little interpretation. The Tax Injunction Act presents a broad shield to a plaintiff's attack in federal court. Its language is mandatory and terse. There is nothing about its language which is mild or permissive.[2] It is only with great difficulty that a plaintiff may clear such a hurdle.

I am convinced[3] that the plaintiffs in this case have no remedy which is either speedy or efficient in the courts of Georgia. This conclusion is no aspersion directed to the noble tribunals of the state. It is a simple statement that a class action suit in federal court will be more efficient than a myriad of different claims, and that the progress of such —even through appeal—will consume less time than will the process of many claims through the Department of Revenue and the courts of the state.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect to "The Agency, Georgia Department of Revenue", and the motion is DENIED with respect to the Honorable Marcus Collins, State Revenue Commissioner.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and my opinion that this civil case presents a controlling ques-

---

[1]"The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."

[2]It could be said in the words of one sage of this district that the language of this brief statute is as "strong as a garlic milkshake."

[3]Although not by the plaintiffs' rambling brief which, *inter alia*, speaks of "State rights, perverted from their true significance, that arrayed themselves against the nation and threatened its existence."

tion of law as to which there is a very substantial ground for difference of opinion, I certify that an immediate appeal from this order by either of the parties will materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. In the event that the Court of Appeals, in its discretion, permits an appeal from this order, all further proceedings in this court shall be stayed.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this 18th day of June, 1985.

Dudley H. Bowen, Jr.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX B

James E. WALDRON, Jack Hobbs, and
all Retired Military, Federal Officers,
Agents, and Employees Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

Marcus COLLINS, Individually, and in his
capacity as Georgia State Revenue Commissioner,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 85-8556.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.

May 6, 1986.

Federal retirees brought class action against State Revenue Commissioner, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging state policy of taxing federal retirement benefits while exempting state retirees' benefits violated equal protection clause and Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, and later added civil rights claim, seeking income tax refunds. Commissioner moved to dismiss. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Dudley H. Bowen, Jr., District Judge, denied the motion, but certified the order for immediate review and Commissioner appealed. The Court of Appeals, Hatchett, J., held that absence of provision for class actions did not render state's procedure for litigating state income tax questions inadequate and thus, federal jurisdiction was precluded under Tax Injunction Act.

Reversed.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Before KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and DUMBAULD*, Senior District Judge.

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:

In this case, we are called upon to decide whether Georgia's procedures for litigating state tax assessments are inadequate because they do not provide for class actions. The district court held Georgia's procedures inadequate; we reverse.

A group of federal retirees residing in Georgia (taxpayers), brought this class action in federal district court alleging that the state of Georgia's tax policy discriminated against them because it imposed taxes on their retirement benefits, but exempted state of Georgia retirees' benefits from taxation. The taxpayers contended that Georgia's policy violated the equal protection clause and the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, 4 U.S.C. § 111.[1]

---

* Honorable Edward Dumbauld, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

1. The Public Salary Tax of 1939 provides that:

> The United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for personal service as an officer or employee of the United States, a territory or possession or political subdivision thereof, the government of the District of Columbia, or an agency or instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, by a duly constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation.

The taxpayers sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state of Georgia and Marcus Collins, Georgia State Revenue Commissioner. Georgia and Collins moved to dismiss the action citing the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 and the eleventh amendment. The Tax Injunction Act prevents taxpayers from litigating in federal courts if state remedies for contesting state tax assessments are "plain, speedy, and efficient."

After a hearing, the district court denied Collins's motion to dismiss, granted the state of Georgia's motion to dismiss, but granted the taxpayers leave to amend their complaint. The taxpayers' amended complaint added the Georgia Department of Revenue as a defendant and added a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking $300 million in state income tax refunds and other damages. Collins and the Georgia Department of Revenue moved to dismiss the taxpayers' amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, again citing the Tax Injunction Act and the eleventh amendment. The district court granted the Georgia Department of Revenue's motion to dismiss, but denied Collins's motion to dismiss. The court held that it was not deprived of jurisdiction because Georgia's remedies for litigating state income tax questions were not "plain, speedy, and efficient" within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act. The district court ruled that the defect in Georgia's scheme was its failure to provide for class actions. The district court certified its order to this court for immediate review. We granted Collins permission to appeal.

On appeal, Collins contends that Georgia's procedures for litigating state income tax questions are "plain, speedy, and efficient" within the meaning of the Tax Injunction

Act, and that the absence of a provision for class actions does not render the state's procedures inadequate. The taxpayers contend, among other things, that the Georgia scheme is inadequate and that the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 confers jurisdiction upon the district court notwithstanding the Tax Injunction Act's bar.[2]

The Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, provides that:

> The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such state.[3]

---

2. The taxpayers also contend that the district court prematurely dismissed the state of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Revenue. That issue is not properly before us; the district court certified its order, and we allowed this appeal to resolve one question: whether Georgia's procedures for litigating state income tax questions are plain, speedy, and efficient within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act?

3. Congress had a two-fold purpose in passing the Tax Injunction Act. First, Congress sought to foreclose the federal forum to foreign corporations that invoked federal diversity jurisdiction to delay payment of state taxes. Congress felt it unjust that corporations could bring such actions in federal court because state citizens could not obtain a federal forum based on diversity jurisdiction. By passing the Tax Injunction Act, therefore, Congress sought to provide for equal treatment between corporations and citizens regarding payment of state taxes. Second, Congress sought to end the disruption of local financing resulting from injunction actions in the federal courts. By bringing actions in the federal courts, taxpayers often frustrated the collection efforts of local officials, forcing them to compromise suits and lose tax revenues. *See Williams v. City of Dothan, Alabama*, 745 F.2d 1406, 1412 n. 7 (11th Cir.1984); *Tramel v. Schrader*, 505 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1975).

Thus, federal jurisdiction may not be exercised if two elements are present: (1) the relief requested by the plaintiff will "enjoin, suspend, or restrain" a state tax assessment; and (2) the state affords the plaintiff a "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy." *Williams v. City of Dothan, Alabama,* 745 F.2d 1406, 1411 (11th Cir. 1984). The first element is present in this case because the taxpayers pray for damages and injunctive relief. *See Moss v. State of Georgia,* 655 F.2d 668 (5th Cir.1981); *A Bonding Company v. Sunnuck,* 629 F.2d 1127, 1133 (5th Cir.1980).

The district court's rationale for holding that Georgia's procedures were not plain, speedy, and efficient within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act, was that:

> [A] class action suit in federal court will be more efficient than a myriad of different claims and that the progress of such—even through appeal—will consume less time than will the process of many claims through the Department of Revenue and the courts of the state.

The district court's evaluation of the relative convenience of the state and federal forums is correct; however, the applicability of the Tax Injunction Act does not turn on which forum is best able to entertain the action. Rather, the Act bars the exercise of federal jurisdiction whenever the state provides adequate procedures to contest state tax matters.

In *Bland v. McHann,* 463 F.2d 21 (5th Cir.1972), the plaintiffs contended that Mississippi's procedure for litigating tax liability questions was inadequate because it did not provide for class action litigation. Among other things, the former Fifth Circuit stated:

> Taxpayers' complaints that the Mississippi remedy is inadequate appear in reality to be an argument that

> a *better* remedy would be available in the federal courts. Neither the judicial decisions nor § 1341 requires that the state remedy be the best remedy available or even equal to or better than the remedy which might be available in the federal courts. Section 1341 merely requires that the state remedy be 'plain, speedy and efficient.'

McHann at 29.

Georgia taxpayers may utilize four statutory means to contest their tax liability. They may: (1) appeal the assessment directly to the superior court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-2-59; (2) pay the tax and bring an action for a refund pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-2-35; (3) file an affidavit of illegality to the levy of execution and have the case heard in superior court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-3-1; and (4) appeal under Georgia's Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-12.

We conclude that the absence of a provision for class actions does not render Georgia's procedures for litigating tax matters inadequate within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act.

Other circuits have come to the same conclusion. *See Miller v. Bauer*, 517 F.2d 27 (7th Cir.1975); *Mandel v. Hutchinson*, 494 F.2d 364 (9th Cir.1974). We are not persuaded to conflict with our sister courts. The taxpayers, citing *Garrett v. Bamford*, 538 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.1976), contend that such a conflict already exists. Reviewing *Garrett*, however, we conclude that the Third Circuit's decision does not conflict with the other circuits.

In *Garrett*, residents of a non-white area of Berks County, Pennsylvania, brought a class action in district

court alleging that the county's method of tax assessment was racially discriminatory in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and the fourteenth amendment. The district court dismissed the claim. The Third Circuit reversed holding that the statutory remedy was not plain, speedy, and efficient in cases where "plaintiffs allege systematic and intentional class based racial discrimination in tax assessments." *Garrett* at 72. *Garrett* does not stand for the proposition that a state procedure which does not provide for class action litigation is not plain, speedy, and efficient within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act.

In a subsequent decision, *Robinson Protective, etc. v. City of Philadelphia,* 581 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.1978), the Third Circuit explained the peculiar concerns underlying the court's decision in *Garrett* which are not commonly present in cases involving challenges to tax assessments. *See Robinson* at 377, 378. The *Robinson* court accorded significance to the fact that *Garrett* involved an equal protection challenge based on a claim of racial discrimination.

> Where state tax codes utilize classifications which are constitutionally suspect, triggering strict scrutiny, we may require greater certainty of the adequacy of the state remedy before closing the federal equity courthouse door. However, where state taxpayers' constitutional challenge necessitates only minimum scrutiny of the rationality of economic classifications, a somewhat less strict certainty as to the adequacy of state remedies may be sufficient.

Robinson at 378 n. 15.

Even if *Garrett* stood for the proposition that the taxpayers advance, we would not be inclined to follow it.

The taxpayers allege several other inadequacies in the Georgia procedure for litigating tax matters in addition to

the lack of a class action litigation remedy. The district court held the Georgia procedure inadequate because it did not provide for class action litigation; consequently, we need not consider claims which go beyond the district court's ruling and certification.

We hold that the absence of a provision for class actions does not render Georgia's procedure for litigating state income tax questions inadequate. The judgment of the district court is reversed.[4]

REVERSED.

---

4. Principles of comity also caution against our providing the taxpayers a federal forum in this case. *See Winicki v. Mallard*, 783 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir.1986), where this court held that the principle of comity barred a federal action challenging the constitutionality of Florida's homestead tax exemption statute, even though the statute was subsequently repealed.

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-8556

JAMES E. WALDRON, JACK HOBBS, and
all Retired Military Federal Officers,
Agents, and Employees similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

MARCUS COLLINS, Individually, and in his
capacity as Georgia State Revenue Commissioner,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion May 6, 11 Cir., 1986, — F.2d —).
(June 30, 1986)

Before KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and DUMBAULD*, Senior District Judge.
PER CURIAM:

(X) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of this panel nor other Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 26), the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

---

* Honorable Edward Dumbauld, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

( ) The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and the Court having been polled at the request of one of the members of the Court and a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 26), the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is also DENIED.

( ) A member of the Court in active service having requested a poll on the reconsideration of this cause en banc, and a majority of the judges in active service not having voted in favor of it, rehearing en banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

Joseph W. Hatchett
United States Circuit Judge

REHG-6
(Rev. 6/82)